This paper proposes an aspiration-based dynamic model for cooperation where a large population of agents are matched afresh every period to play a Prisoner's Dilemma. At each point in time, agents hold a common aspiration level which is updated on the basis of some``population statistic'', i.e. a certain scalar summary (e.g. average payo¨) associated to the current state. On the other hand, those agents who feel``dissatis®ed'' (relative to current aspiration) switch actions at a rate which is increasing in the magnitude of the dissatisfaction. The resulting process is shown to converge in the long run under quite general conditions. Moreover, if agents are responsive enough, the long-run social state displays some extent of cooperation, with a constant positive fraction of the population (always less than half ) choosing to cooperate in every period.
Introduction
The Prisoner's Dilemma has become a paradigmatic context for studying the possible rise of cooperative behavior. In response to its familiar``paradox,'' the game-theoretic literature has approached this game from a wide variety of different perspectives (supergames, incomplete information, bounded rationality, evolution, etc.).1 In each of these cases, it is a crucial requirement for cooperative behavior to materialize that players' interaction should display a certain degree of stability over time.2 Otherwise, the fact that cooperation is strictly dominated in any one-shot situation leads to having full defection as the only stable social con®guration, at least when the population involved is very large.3
This raises the question of whether there might be some considerations inducing cooperation (at least partially) in social situations where the population is large and there is substantial turnover in the interaction pattern. Casual observation suggests that in many such situations (e.g., wheǹ`s trangers'' orderly interact in, say, queues and tra½c, or when valuable lost items are returned) indiscriminate opportunistic behavior does not fully prevail, despite the substantial gains that it may occasionally avail.
Of course, one possible rationalization of such altruistic behavior is that some people are guided by moral (non-opportunistic) principles. Here, however, we put forward an alternative (possibly complementary) view. Spe-ci®cally, we propose a very simple model of bounded rationality which leads to a partial (never full) degree of cooperation under those circumstances. The context involves a large set of agents (a continuum) who are randomly matched in pairs every period to play a Prisoner's Dilemma. On the basis of past experience (see below), they hold at every point in time a certain aspiration on the payo¨s they should get from the game. If, for any particular agent, this aspiration is ful®lled (i.e. the payo¨obtained does not fall below aspiration), this agent is assumed to remain choosing her former action. Otherwise, she changes it with some probability, which will generally depend on the magnitude of the dissatisfaction.
The process by which aspiration levels are modi®ed in response to past experience is modelled as a social-based process of adjustment. Speci®cally, the whole population is postulated to have a common level of aspiration that is updated on the basis of a certain (``reasonable'')4 statistic of the current payo¨distribution. If the current statistic is higher than the prevailing aspiration, the latter gradually grows; reciprocally, if it falls below the aspiration level, a corresponding downwards adjustment takes place.
This approach contrasts with the polar individual-based formulation pursued (with some exceptions) in most of the related literature ± see Section 5 for a review. This literature focuses on contexts involving only small number of players (typically just two of them) and postulates that each individual's as-1 See, for example, Friedman (1977) for models displaying inde®nite repeated interaction, Kreps et al (1982) for a context with incomplete information, Neyman (1985) or Rubinstein (1986) for an approach based on bounded rationality, and Fudenberg & Maskin (1990) or Binmore & Samuelson (1992) for an analysis re¯ecting evolutionary considerations. 2 Even when, as in many evolutionary models, random re-matching of players is assumed every period ± cf. Axelrod (1984) ± the game assumed to be played at each``point'' in time is in fact a repeated game, i.e., re¯ects some stable interaction between the two selected opponents.
3 In a context where the population is not too large (relative to the discount rate and the gains from unilateral defection), Kandori (1992) and Ellison (1994) show that cooperation can be sustained in the Prisoner's Dilemma as part of an intertemporal equilibrium even with repeated random matching. 4 As we shall explain in Section 2, any function of the population pro®le whose range is between the cooperation and defection symmetric payo¨s is allowed (cf. (6)). For example, this function may be chosen equal to the population-weighted average payo¨. But, to consider alternative extremes, it could also be chosen to coincide with any smooth approximation of either the mode or the uniformly-weighted average of the payo¨distribution.
